The Constitutional Constraints on State Regulations of the Internet: ACLU v. Johnson by Shea, Tim
Denver Law Review 
Volume 78 
Issue 2 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 3 
December 2020 
The Constitutional Constraints on State Regulations of the 
Internet: ACLU v. Johnson 
Tim Shea 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Tim Shea, The Constitutional Constraints on State Regulations of the Internet: ACLU v. Johnson, 78 Denv. 
U. L. Rev. 231 (2000). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please 
contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
COMPUTER LAW
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE
REGULATIONS OF THE INTERNET: ACLU V. JOHNSON1
INTRODUCTION
What is the Internet? Who controls the World Wide Web? Where
are the boundaries in Cyberspace? These are all questions without clear
answers. The government has tried to come to terms with a phenomenon
that is understood by few and utilized by many. Researchers and scholars
alike have attempted to measure the impact of the Internet on society
with varying degrees of success. The results of the many attempts to
measure the Internet have been unclear simply because there is no accu-
rate way to test the results. Yet, some statistics regarding the impact of
the Internet are indeed impressive. For example, one survey estimated
that U.S. consumers spent approximately $8.2 billion on online pur-
chases during the 1998 holiday season.2 The same survey estimated that
there were 57,037,000 Internet users as of May 1998.3 Without doubt this
number will have significantly increased by the time this comment is
published. The fact remains that the Internet is a medium of both com-
merce and communication with unknown potential and impact on human
society. But with this unique growth comes unique challenges. Nowhere
have these challenges been more controversial or more publicly debated
than in the American judicial system. Within the last decade, American
courts wrestled with the Internet on several occasions. The judicial in-
quiries primarily focused on the constraints the Constitution imposes on
the Internet. These challenges primarily addressed two constitutional
concerns: First Amendment guarantees of free speech and the Commerce
Clause.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently
delivered an opinion on the issue of regulating the dissemination of in-
formation over the Internet. In ACLU v. Johnson,4 the court considered
the constitutional validity of a New Mexico statute.5 This decision was
one of first impression to the Tenth Circuit. The plaintiffs challenged the
New Mexico statute on both First Amendment and Commerce Clause
grounds.6 The court reached its decision to invalidate the New Mexico
1. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
2. World Wide Web User Statistics, available at
http://www.why-not.com/company/stats.htm (last visited March 1. 2000).
3. Id.
4. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
5. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (1999) (preliminarily enjoined from enforcement at ACLU
v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1164 (1999)).
6. 194 F.3d at 1152 (10th Cir. 1999).
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statute by relying heavil4 upon a recent United States Supreme Court
decision, Reno v. ACLU. The primary challenge to the statute in John-
son alleged that the New Mexico statute placed an unconstitutional bur-
den on the First Amendment's free speech guarantees. 8 The Tenth Circuit
focused primarily on the First Amendment issue in invalidating the stat-
ute. Therefore, the primary concern of this comment is to examine the
First Amendment implications of the Johnson decision by the Tenth Cir-
cuit.
Part I of this comment provides a brief historical context within
which the Court recently decided ACLU v. Johnson.9 Part II examines the
ramifications of the decision with respect to First Amendment guarantees
and future regulation of information distributed over the internet. Part III
discusses the application of the Commerce Clause in the context of
regulating information distributed over the internet. Finally, Part IV
analyzes the future implications of Johnson and relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The recent Tenth Circuit decision in ACLU v. Johnson ° arose in the
context of the explosive growth of the internet both as a means of com-
munication and as an instrument of commerce. The phenomenal growth
of the Internet attracted the attention of concerned state and federal leg-
islators. Accordingly, the internet also produced constitutional challenges
as a by-product of its unprecedented growth."1 In reaching its decision in
Johnson, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily upon the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Reno v. ACLU (hereinafter "Reno I1").12 This
7. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
8. 194 F.3d at 1153 (10th Cir. 1999).
9. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
10. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
11. See Reno v. ACLU ("Reno 1"), 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)(preliminarily enjoining
the enforcement of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (b)); Reno v.
ACLU ("Reno H"), 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (affirming the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in granting a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (b) (1999)); ACLU v. Reno ("Reno
III"), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (affirming a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement
of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(1999)); ACLU v. Reno ("Reno IV"),
217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000)(affirming the District Court in Reno II/);United States v. Playboy
Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (U.S. 2000); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D.
Va. 2000) (granting a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-391
(Mich. Supp. 1999) (amended 2000)); Cyberspace Comm., Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (granting preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Michigan law, Pub. Act No.
33 (1999), amending Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.671); Hatch v. Superior Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453
(Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2000) (upholding California law regulating the Internet as Constitutional as
applied).
12. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
[Vol. 78:2
2000] COMPUTER LAW
case struck down a portion of a federal statute 13 that sought to regulate
the dissemination of materials deemed harmful to minors over the Inter-
net. 14 The Court held that the federal statute was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad and that the statute violated the First Amendment guaran-
tee of freedom of speech. 15 Since Reno H played a prominent role in the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Johnson, Reno II deserves closer examina-
tion.
The Telecommunications Act of 199616 promoted the primary Con-
gressional goal to "reduce regulation and encourage the rapid deploy-
ment of new telecommunications technologies."' This Act contains
seven titles, one of which (Title V) is known as the "Communications
Decency Act of 1996" (hereinafter CDA). 18 On February 8, 1996, twenty
plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania against the Attorney General of the United
States and the Department of Justice. 19 The plaintiffs included the
American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter ACLU), Human Rights
Watch, Electronic Privacy Information Center and other such potentially
effected parties. 20 These plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
§§223(a)(1) and 233(d) of the CDA.2' The District Court entered a tem-
porary restraining order against the enforcement of §223(a)(1)(B)(ii).
22
13. The Court struck down a portion of the Communications Decency Act of 1 996, located at
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) and 223(d). Section 223(a) stated in pertinent part: "(a) Whoever-(1) in
interstate or foreign communications--(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(I) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the
recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the communication; (2) knowingly permits any
telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1)
with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both." Section 223(d) stated in pertinent part: "(d) Whoever-(1) in interstate or
foreign communications knowingly-(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific
person or persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless
of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication, or (2) knowingly
permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title
18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
14. Reno, 521 U.S. at 857.
15. Id.
16. PUB. L. 104-104, 110 STAT. 56.
17. Reno, 521 U.S. at 857 (citing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110
Stat. at 56).
18. Id.
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Twenty-seven additional plaintiffs also challenging the provisions of the
CDA subsequently filed a second suit.23 The two suits were consolidated
and evidentiary hearings were held before a three-judge panel. 24 Fol-
lowing these hearings, each judge issued a separate opinion, unani-
mously holding that the CDA was likely unconstitutional and granting an
injunction against its enforcement.25 The government appealed this deci-
sion directly to the United States Supreme Court by invoking §561 of the
CDA.26
On appeal, the government argued that the District Court erred in
finding that the CDA violated both the First and Fifth Amendment of the
27Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's holding
on First Amendment grounds without addressing the Fifth Amendment
contentions. 28 The government relied upon Ginsburg v. New York, 2 9 FCC
30 31v. Pacifica Foundation, and Renton v. Playtime Theatres to argue that
the challenged provisions of the CDA were constitutional. 3' The Su-
preme Court distinguished each of these decisions from the present sce-
nario in Reno /.33
Ginsburg v. New York upheld the constitutionality of a New York
statute that prohibited the selling of material that was considered obscene
for minors to persons less than seventeen years of age.34 The case in-
volved the criminal prosecution of a storeowner who sold two "girlie"
magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy.35 The Supreme Court reasoned that
obscene materials are not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech.36 However, under the Court's rationale, the "girlie" magazines
involved in Ginsburg were not obscene for adults.37 The statute in ques-
tion did not restrain the defendant from selling such items to persons
seventeen years or older.38 The statute merely required that such material
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 862-64. Chief Judge Sloviter concluded that the terms of the CDA were overbroad
and could not reasonably be read narrowly. 929 F. Supp. at 853-55. Judge Buckwalter concluded
that terms "indecent", "patently offensive", and "in context" in § 223(d)(1) were unconstitutionally
vague. 929 F. Supp. at 863-65. Judge Dalzell concluded that the CDA would "abridge significant
protected speech." 929 F. Supp. at 867-79.
26. Id. at 864.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
30. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
31. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
32. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
33. Id.
34. Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 633.
35. Id. at 631.
36. Id. at 635 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
37. Id. at 634 (citing Redrup v. State of New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
38. /d at 634-35.
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not be sold to persons under age seventeen. 39 The Court concluded that
the state had an interest in protecting the well being of its children, that
the materials in question could reasonably be held to impair the ethical
and moral development of minors.40 Ultimately, the Court held that the
statute did not violate any constitutional guarantees.4 '
The Reno H Court found several significant facts that differentiated
the instant situation from the facts found in Ginsburg. First, the Ginsburg
statute did not prohibit the sale of "girlie" magazines to parents who
wished to provide the magazines to their children.42 However, under the
CDA, neither parental consent nor parental participation would avoid the
criminal sanctions.4 Second, the Ginsburg statute applied exclusively to
commercial transactions44 while the CDA contained no limitations on the
type of speech to which it applied.45 Third, the Ginsburg statute defined
materials that were harmful to minors as those "utterly without redeem-
ing social importance for minors." 6 In Reno II, however, the CDA pro-
vided no such requirement. 47 Finally, the Ginsburg statute defined mi-
nors as under age seventeen while the CDA defined minors as those un-
der age eighteen.48 The Reno 1I Court felt that this additional year might
be significant in regulating access to indecent materials.
49
The government also relied upon Federal Communications Com-
mission v. Pacifica Foundation50 (hereinafter Pacifica) on appeal in
Reno I. In Pacifica, the Court upheld a declaratory order of the Federal
Communications Commission (hereinafter FCC), which concluded that
an afternoon radio broadcast of a comedic monologue was indecent.
5'
The Pacifica Court held that the ease of access by children to the broad-
cast "coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsburg justified special
treatment of indecent broadcasting." 2 The Reno II Court distinguished
the Pacifica holding on several grounds. First, the FCC, an agency that
regularly regulates radio transmissions, issued the order in Pacifica.
53
Further, the FCC regulation concerned a specific broadcast with respect
to when, rather then whether, it would be permissible to broadcast such a
39. Id.
40. Id. at 641-45.
41. Id.
42. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865 (citing Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 639).
43. Id. at 865.
44. Id. (citing Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 647).
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing Ginsburg. 390 U.S. at 646).
47. Id. (citing CDA § 223(a)(1); § 223(d)).
48. Id. at 865-66.
49. id. at 866.
50. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
51. Reno, 521 U.S. at 866 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730).
52. Id. at 866-67 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-750).
53. Id. at 867.
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program via radio transmission.54 In contrast, the CDA prohibitions did
not provide for particular times when the dissemination of indecent mate-
rial would be accepted and the CDA prohibitions are not subject to any
government agency control. 5 Second, the Commission's "order was not
punitive," while the CDA is punitive in nature.56 Finally, the Commis-
sion's order applied to radio broadcast, a medium of communication that
historically limited First Amendment protections.57 In contrast, the Inter-
net has no such history of regulation.58 Further, the Reno H Court noted
that the risk of accidental encounter of indecent material by minors is
much more remote on the internet in comparison to radio broadcast due
to a series of affirmative steps that are required to access materials on the
internet. 59 In light of these factual differences, the Court held that
Pacifica was not directly applicable to the facts of Reno 11.60
Finally, the government in Reno H relied on Renton v. Playtime
61 6Theatres, Inc. to argue that the CDA was constitutionally sound.62 The
Renton Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult theaters in
63residential neighborhoods. The Court upheld this ordinance because its
focus was not the offensive nature of the theaters themselves, but rather
the "secondary effects" such as crime and deteriorating property values.
64
The Reno I Court held that the CDA was not a similar type of "time,
place, and manner regulation" as was the ordinance in Renton.65 Rather,
the Court held that the CDA was a "content-based, blanket restriction on
speech, and as such cannot be 'properly analyzed as a form of time,
place, and manner regulation.' 66 Therefore, the Reno II Court held that
all three of the government's key precedents were inapposite to the facts
before it on appeal.67
After reviewing the government's key cases, the Reno H Court con-
sidered the proper standard of scrutiny to apply in content-based regula-
tion of the internet. The Court noted that "each medium of expression...
may present its own problems., 68 Additionally, the Court agreed with the




57. Id. (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 868.
61. 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (hereinafter Renton).
62. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
63. Id.
64. Renton, 475 U.S. at 49.
65. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868.
66. Id. (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 46).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)).
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'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen un-
bidden., 69 Thus, the Court recognized the unique characteristics of the
internet as a medium of expression. This unique nature became the cor-
nerstone of the Court's analysis and conclusion.
First, the Court considered the claim that the challenged provisions
of the CDA were unconstitutionally vague and a violation of the First
Amendment. Specifically, the Court addressed the statutory term "inde-
cent ' 70 and the statutory, phrase "in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs.",71 The Court reasoned that the
lack of definition of these terms would "provoke uncertainty among
speakers about how the two standards relate to each other .... 72 The
effect of the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding these terms, in com-
bination with the potential criminal consequences that would result from
a violation, lead the Court to conclude that this ambiguous legislation
was a content-based regulation that would have an "obvious chilling ef-
fect on free speech. 73 The government countered by arguing that the
CDA was no more vague than the obscenity standard provided in Miller
v. California.
74
In Miller v. California,75 the Court set forth a test for obscenity,
which still controls today. The Miller test provides that:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a pat-
ently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the appli-
cable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks se-
rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
76
The government asserted that because the CDA's term "patently offen-
sive" is one part of the Miller test, the CDA could not be unconstitu-
tional.77 However, the Court found this argument unpersuasive because
the Miller test contains a crucial requirement that the CDA did not re-
quire. The Miller test requires that the proscribed materials be "specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law.",78 The Court reasoned that this
requirement would reduce the vagueness found in the "patently offen-
69. Id. at 869 (quoting Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 844 (finding 88)).
70. As used in 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a).
71. As used in 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d).
72. Id. at 871.
73. Id. at 872.
74. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
75. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
76. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
77. Id. at 873.
78. Id. (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
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sive" standard of the CDA.7 9 Yet such a requirement is not contained in
the text of the CDA. Therefore, the Court found the CDA to be inher-
ently vague while the Miller test provided adequate protections aqainst
vague definitions of proscribed speech in content-based regulations.
The Reno H Court also briefly considered the other two prongs of
the Miller test. The Court first addressed the requirement that the mate-
rial lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value., 82 The
Court noted that in prior applications of this prong of the Miller test, the
requirement is "not judged by contemporary community standards.,
83
Thus, this "societal value" requirement allows courts to set forth a na-
tional standard for a "socially redeeming value. 84 The Reno H Court
took notice that the CDA could not simultaneously adhere to the Miller
test requirement of applying the "community standards" test as a ques-
tion of fact, left to a)ury, and also provide a uniform national standard of
content regulation. As the Court noted in Miller, the determination of
"what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is 'patently offensive' are es-
sentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too big and too di-
verse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be
,86articulated for all 50 states in a single formulation." Yet, while the
CDA was under Committee consideration in the Senate, the conference
reports assert that the "CDA was intended 'to establish a uniform na-
tional standard of content regulation."' 87 The Reno II Court concluded
that the CDA clearly contrasted with the test set forth in Miller, and as a
result, it "presents a greater threat of censoring speech that in fact, falls
outside the statute's scope. '' 88 Thus, the CDA was held to be an over-
inclusive restriction of speech based upon content.
89
In construing the CDA as an over-inclusive, content-based restric-
tion, the Reno H Court moved to consider the necessary standard of re-
view arising from a challenge to the First Amendment.9" Precedent
clearly dictated the rule that in the consideration of free speech rights of
adults, "sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
82. Id. at 873 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
83. Id. (quoting Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497. 500 (1987)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 873, n.39.
86. Id. (quoting Miller. 413 U.S. 15, 30).
87. Id. at n. 39. (quoting S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, p. 189, 191 (1996), 142 Cong. Rec.
H 1145, HI 165-H1166 (Feb. 1, 1996)).
88. Id. at 874.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 874-75.
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by the First Amendment." 9' The government asserted that it held a le-
gitimate state interest in protecting children from indecent material by
92the enactment of the CDA. However, under a strict scrutiny test the
Court noted that the "burden placed upon adult speech is unacceptable if
less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate state purpose that the statute was enacted to serve., 93 The
Court did not explicitly consider whether or not the asserted govern-
mental interest in protecting minor children was indeed a legitimate state
interest; rather, it merely assumed that such an interest was legitimate
and moved to consider the effects of the statute itself on adult speech.94
In evaluating the effects of the CDA, the Court acknowledged that
despite its prior recognition of a governmental interest in protecting chil-
dren from harmful materials, 95 such an interest "does not justify an un-
necessarily broad suppression of speech addressed by adults . . . the
Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult population ... to ... only what
is fit for children.' ' '96 The mere fact that the stated purpose of the CDA
was to protect children was not conclusive with respect to its Constitu-
tional validity; rather, the Court recognized that its role in such situations
was to "make sure that Congress has designed its statute to accomplish
its purpose 'without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech.' 97 The Court agreed with the District Court's factual analysis,
which suggested that the over-breath of the CDA would curtail the abil-
ity of adults to communicate over the internet. 98 The District Court noted
that at the time of trial, no technology existed to provide an effective
method for a sender of information to assure that only adults accessed
that information.99 Additionally, the requirement of such age verification
systems would be "prohibitively expensive for non-commercial as well
some commercial speakers" to implement and utilize. 100
In the final weighing of the prohibitive effects of the CDA on adult
speech against the state's interest in protecting children, the Reno II
Court ultimately held the challenged terms of the CDA to be facially
91. Id. at 874 (quoting Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126(1989)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See generally Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in
Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427 (discussing the need for the
Supreme Court to more fully consider the asserted government interests in cases involving the
regulation of the content of speech, where the protection of children is the stated purpose of the law).
95. Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (citing Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 639; Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749).
96. Id. (quoting Denver Area Ed. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759
(1996)).
97. Id. at 876 (quoting Denver Area Ed., 518 U.S. at 741).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 876.
100. Id. at 877.
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over-broad, imposing an undue restriction on the content of speech.' 10 In
the concluding words of the Court, "government regulation of the con-
tent of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas
than to encourage it. The interests in encouraging freedom of expression
in a democratic society outweigh any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship."
' 10 2
Since the delivery of the Reno H decision, several other federal
courts considered similar challenges to state statutes that had substan-
tially similar language and goals. 103 The recent Tenth Circuit decision in
ACLU v. Johnson'°4 is one such case.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES
A. ACLU v. Johnson
1. Facts
The plaintiffs in ACLU v. Johnson'0 5 consisted of a large group of
individuals affected by a New Mexico statute 0 6 that sought to regulate
the dissemination of information to minors over the internet. The plain-
tiffs included the ACLU, Feminist.com, Full Circle Books, OBGYN.net,
Santa Fe Online and several others.10 7 The defendants were Gary John-
son, the Governor of New Mexico, and Patricia A. Madrid, the Attorney
General of New Mexico.'
0 8
The statute in question sought to criminalize the computerized dis-
semination of materials harmful to minors.' °9 This statute stated in rele-
vant part:
Dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer
consists of the use of a computer communications system that allows
the input, output, examination or transfer of computer data or com-
puter programs from one computer to another, to knowingly and in-
tentionally initiate or engage in communication with a person under
eighteen years of age when such communication in whole or in part
depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual intercourse or any other
101. Id.
102. Id. at 885.
103. See cases, supra note 11.
104. 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
105. Id.
106. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (1999).
107. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1149.
108. Id.
109. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (1999).
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sexual conduct. Whoever commits dissemination of material that is
harmful to a minor by computer is guilty of a misdemeanor.
110
The plaintiffs based their initial challenge in the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico on the grounds that the criminal
statute regulating the content of material on the Internet violated the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution."' The plaintiffs sought a pre-
liminary and permanent injunction against the enforcement of the statute
in question.'12 The District Court addressed the preliminary issues of
standing, the bar against such a suit provided in the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and the necessity for the court to abstain from granting an injunc-
tion until the New Mexico Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret
the language of the statute. 3The District Court held that the plaintiffs
had proper standing to bring this suit, the Eleventh Amendment did not
bar this suit, and the issue was ripe for judicial review. The District Court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for a relimnary injunction, therein pro-
hibitinf enforcement of the statute." P4The defendants appealed this deci-
sion.
The decision by the Tenth Circuit considered the appeal brought by
the defendants.1 6 The defendants argued on appeal that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to bring this suit; that the court erred in determining that
the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge; that
the court erroneously held that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable
harm unless the injunction was issued; and that the court reached various
other erroneous legal conclusions." 7 The Tenth Circuit ultimately af-
firmed the District Court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction." 18
2. Standing
The Court of Appeals first addressed the defendants' challenge to the
plaintiffs' standing. The court noted that "standing is a threshold
110. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (A) (1999).
111. ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1026 (D.N.M. 1998). The First Amendment states
in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " The Fifth
Amendment states in relevant part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 states in relevant part: "...
[NIor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... "
Article II, Section 8, Paragraph 1,3 states in relevant part: "The Congress shall have Power ... 3. To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ... 
112. Id.




117. Id. at 1153-54.
118. Id. at 1163.
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issue,"'' 9 and in order to establish standing, the plaintiffs "must have
suffered an 'injury in fact.' " 20 Thus, in order to demonstrate that they
suffered an "injury in fact" the plaintiffs had to show "an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."' 12' The defendants
argued that because the statute had not been enforced, the plaintiffs
lacked standing.122 In fact, the statute in question was not effective at the
time the plaintiffs brought the suit. 123 Thus, the defendants argued that
the plaintiffs had not suffered any "real and concrete threat of prosecu-
,,124 125tion from law enforcement authorities. The court disagreed.
The Tenth Circuit's reasoning on this issue relied heavily upon Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife. 126 In Lujan, the Court stated that "[n]o one
should have to go through being arrested for a felony, publicly shamed,
and pay for a defense only to have a court find that the newly enacted
statute is unconstitutional. This can, and should, be determined before
such injury occurs."'' 27 Additionally, the instant court reasoned that the
issue in this case was ripe for review.128 The court stated, "if a threatened
injury is sufficiently 'imminent' to establish standing, the constitutional
requirements of the ripeness doctrine will necessarily be satisfied."'
' 29
Further the court recognized that "customary ripeness analysis ... is...
relaxed somewhat . . . where a facial challenge implicating First
Amendment values, is brought." 30 Thus, the court reasoned, "in that
situation, 'reasonable predictability of enforcement or threats of en-
forcement, without more, have sometimes been enough to ripen a
claim."" 131 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the District Court's holding
119. Id. at 1154 (citing Keys v. School Dist. No. 1, 119F.3d 1437, 1445 (10th Cir. 1997)).
120. Id. (citing Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1572 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992)).
121. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
122. Id.
123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (effective date July 1, 1998). The U.S. District Court for
the District of New Mexico issued its decision granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of this statute on June 24, 1998. 4. F.Supp. 2d at 1024 (D.N.M.
1998). Thus, the injunction was granted prior to the date that the statute in question was to become
effective.
124. ACLU, 194 F. 3d at 1154 (citing Defendants' brief at 43).
125. Id.
126. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
127. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1154 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2).
128. Id. at 1155.
129. Id. at 1155 (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423,
1428 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
130. Id. (quoting New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th
Cir. 1995)).
131. Id. (citing Gonzales, 64 F.3d at 1499 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Martin Tractor Co. v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 627 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).
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The District Court held that the New Mexico statute in question vio-
lated the First and Fourteenth Amendments "because it effectively bans
speech that is constitutionally protected for adults;" it does not "directly
and materially advance a compelling governmental interest;" it is not
"the least restrictive means of serving its stated interest;" it "interferes
with the rights of minors to access and view material that to them is pro-
tected by the First Amendment;" it is "substantially overbroad;" and it
"prevents people from communicating and accessing information
anonymously." The defendants challenged these findings on appeal by
arguing that the statute "can and must be read narrowly, and so nar-
rowed, the statue is constitutional under the authority of Ginsburg v. New
York. ,134 The court ultimately rejected the defendants' argument and
affirmed the findings of the lower court on this issue. 135 In reaching its
conclusion, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily upon the recent decision of
Reno v. ACLU (Reno II).1
36
The United States Supreme Court stated that the government may
"regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest."'1 37 Further, the Court noted that "sexual
expression which is indecent but is not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment." 138 Thus, the Court held that although a "compelling" gov-
ernmental interest existed in "protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of minors;" nevertheless, the means chosen by the govern-
ment must be "carefully tailored" to meet that end. 139 The Court applied
this same standard of "strict scrutiny" to the content-based regulation
found in Reno v. ACLU (Reno H).14°
In Reno H, the Supreme Court held that portions of the Communica-
tions Decency Act (CDA) 14 1 violated the First Amendment.142 The Reno
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1156.
134. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1156 (citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
135. Id.
136. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
137. Johnson, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (quoting Sable Communications Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989)). This is essentially a "strict scrutiny" test utilized where fundamental rights are
implicated.
138. Id. (quoting Sable Comm., 492 U.S. at 126 (1989)).
139. Id. (quoting Sable Comm., 492 U.S. at 126 (1989)).
140. Id. (discussing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870). See discussion of Reno H, 521 U.S. 844
(1997), infra Part 1.
141. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1), (d) (2000).
142. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1156.
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H Court concluded that "given the size of the potential audience for most
messages... the sender must be charged with knowing that one or more
minors will likely view it.",143 Additionally, the Court viewed the poten-
tial costs to the many non-commercial users of the internet to verify the
age of its viewers would be prohibitive of speech. 144 Thus, the Court held
that the CDA placed too heavy a burden on the exercise of protected
speech and therefore the challenged provisions were unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.
145
The Tenth Circuit Johnson decision followed essentially the same
rationale in determining that the New Mexico statute in question was
also unconstitutionally vague and broad. In Johnson, the court noted that
the similarity between the CDA discussed in Reno H and the New Mex-
ico statute currently in question compelled the same result. 146 In Johnson,
as in Reno H, the government argued that the statute in question could
and should be construed narrowly. 147 The government in Johnson argued
that the statute would only apply in situations where an adult sender of a
message "knowingly and intentionally" sends a harmful message directly
to a minor. 48 Therefore, the statute would not apply to chat rooms or
other situations where both adults and children were involved simultane-
ously. 149 The government, like in Reno H, attempted to liken the scenario
here to the one faced in Ginsburg v. New York. 150 Both the Reno H and
Johnson courts determined the situation in Ginsburg to be factually dif-
ferent from the regulations presented in both cases.
15'
In Ginsburg, the Court addressed the sale of sexually explicit materi-
als in a face-to-face situation.15 2 In contrast, both the Reno II and John-
son situations involved the dissemination of sexually explicit materials
over the Internet. The Johnson court agreed with the Reno H Court that
the regulation of information being disseminated over the internet intro-
duced new problems that more fully, and consequently unduly, restricted
the freedom of speech and expression.153 The Johnson court noted that
the unique nature of the internet does not allow for accurate, in person
age verification prior to the dissemination of sexually explicit
materials.1 54 Similarly, as noted by the Supreme Court in Reno H, the
143. Reno IA 521 U.S. at 876.
144. Id. at 876-77.
145. Id. at 885-86.




150. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).






Johnson court recognized that "[t]he Internet does not distinguish be-
tween minors and adults in their audience. To comply with the Act, a
communicant must speak only in language suitable for children."' 55 The
chilling effect on the otherwise protected adult speech by both the CDA
in Reno H and the New Mexico statute in Johnson, coupled with the in-
ability of internet information providers to perform physical age verifi-
cation, led the Johnson court to conclude that Ginsburg did not apply to
content based restrictions of information disseminated via the internet.1
56
Finally, the government in Johnson argued that the defenses explic-
itly provided in the New Mexico statute in question allowed for a narrow
reading, thereby saving an otherwise invalid unconstitutional
provision. 157 The court disagreed. 58 The defense to which the govern-
ment referred provided a "good faith" defense. 159 This "good faith" de-
fense essentially allowed parties who disseminated harmful information
over the internet to plead an affirmative defense that they took reason-
able steps to restrict access to the information by minors. 160 In Johnson,
the court concluded that these defenses did "not salvage an otherwise
unconstitutionally broad statute." 16' This holding was similar to the Su-
preme Court decision with respect to comparable statutory defenses en-
countered in Reno/H162 and by the district court in Cyberspace Commu-
nications, Inc. 163 Thus, the statutory defenses for "good faith" efforts by
155. Id. (citing Cyberspace Comm., Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 747 (E.D. Mich.
1999)).
156. Id. at 1160.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1152.
160. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-37-3.2(C) (1999). This portion of the statute stated in relevant part:
(C) In a prosecution for dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer,
it is a defense that the defendant has: (1) in good faith taken reasonable, effective and
appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to
indecent materials on computer, including any method that is feasible with available
technology; (2) restricted access to indecent materials by requiring the use of a verified
credit card, debit account, adult access code or adult personal identification number; or
(3) in good faith established a mechanism such as labeling, segregation or other means
that enables the indecent material to be automatically blocked or screened by software or
other capability reasonably available to persons who wish to effect such blocking or
screening and the defendant has not otheiwise solicited a minor not subject to such
screening or blocking capabilities to access the indecent material or to circumvent the
screening or blocking.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-37-3.2(C).
161. Johnson, 194 F.3d. at 1160.
162. Id. (citing Reno, 521 U.S. at 882).
163. Id. (citing Cyberspace Comm. Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d at 751). In Cyberspace Comm. Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, addressed a
challenge to an amendment to a Michigan statute (Pub. Act No. 33 (1999), amending Mich. Comp.
Laws § 722.671 et seq.). Cyberspace Comm. Inc., 55 F. Supp.2d at 740. This amendment
prohibited the use of computers or the Internet to disseminate sexually explicit materials to minors.
Id. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of this amendment,
arguing that it violated the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
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defendants have not been held to provide adequate protections against
the otherwise unconstitutional restraint placed upon protected speech in
any statutes attempting to regulate the dissemination of indecent materi-
als to minors via the internet.
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Johnson court next considered the effects of the New Mexico
statute on the Commerce Clause. 64 The defendants argued that the New
Mexico statute in question sought to regulate merely intrastate activities;
and therefore, the statute did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause
of the Constitution. 165 Again, the court returned to the unique nature of
the internet in its analysis. The court noted that the geographic limita-
tions placed upon states' jurisdictional limits in the field of commercial
regulation do not easily apply to commerce via the internet.166 The court
stated that given the lack of geographic limitations on the internet, it is
impossible to regulate only those communications that occur within the
geographic borders of a single state. 167 The statute "cannot effectively be
limited to purely intrastate communications over the internet because no
such communications exist." 68 As a result, any state statute, including
the one in question in Johnson, regulates conduct outside the state; and
therefore, violates the Commerce Clause limitations of the United States
Constitution. Thus, the Johnson court held that the New Mexico statute
"represents an attempt to regulate interstate conduct occurring outside
New Mexico's borders, and is accordingly a per se violation of the
Commerce Clause."
169
Second, the Johnson court considered the burden placed upon inter-
state commerce in comparison to the local benefit.' 70 The defendants
argued that the state of New Mexico held a significant interest in pro-
tecting minors from sexually explicit materials.171 The court noted that
the local benefits to New Mexico were insubstantial.172 If the court were
to read the statute as the defendants proposed, then this statute would
affect only one-on-one communications between a New Mexico sender
The District Court held that the amendments, if enforced against the plaintiffs, would indeed violate
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at
753. Thus, the court granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the amendments
against the plaintiffs. Id. at 754.
164. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160.
165. Id. at 1161.
166. Id.
167. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160. (citing Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp 160, 168-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
168. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160. (citing Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F.Supp at 171).






and a New Mexico recipient whom the sender knew to be a minor.'73
Additionally, given the fact that this statute could not affect materials
sent from international sources, the court reasoned that this statute would
"almost certainly fail to accomplish the government's interest in shield-
ing children from pornography on the Internet."' 74 Accordingly, the court
held that these "limited local benefits '[are] an extreme burden on inter-
state commerce.' Thus, section 30-37-3.2(A) constitutes an invalid indi-
rect regulation on interstate commerce."
75
Finally, on the issue of Commerce Clause violation, the Johnson
court considered the District Court's holding that the New Mexico statute
unconstitutionally imposes inconsistent regulations on the internet .
76
The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court's holding that the stat-
ute did indeed impose inconsistent regulation on the internet, and that
"the Internet, like . . . rail and highway traffic . . . requires a cohesive
national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to deter-
mine their obligations."' 177 Thus, the Court held that the statute violated
the Commerce Clause limitations on state actions and was invalid. 178
A. Conclusion
In sum, the Court of Appeals held the New Mexico statute in ques-
tion was unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable against the plain-
tiffs. 179 The Court noted that its discussion of the Commerce Clause
challenges was unnecessary, but nonetheless instructive and important. 8
As a result of its holding, the Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs'
requested injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the New Mexico
statute.18
1. Post-Johnson Decisions
Since the Johnson decision from the Tenth Circuit was issued on
November 2, 1999, there have been some new developments in this area
of Constitutional Law. On October 21, 1998, Congress enacted the Child
Online Protection Act (COPA) into law. 1 2 COPA attempted to "'ad-
dress[] the specific concerns raised by the Supreme Court' in invalidating
the Communications Decency Act (CDA)."'' 8 3 The Supreme Court in
173. Id. at 1162.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
176. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162.
177. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162. (quoting American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 182).
178. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1163.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1160.
181. Id. at 1164.
182. ACLU v. Reno (Reno IV), 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000).
183. Id. at 167 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-775 at 12(1998).
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Reno H, discussed above, previously invalidated the CDA.184 In compari-
son to the CDA, COPA specifically addressed the dissemination of mate-
rial to minors over the internet by commercial persons and /or entities.1
85
In enacting COPA, Congress attempted to cure some of the key defects
of the CDA, as highlighted in Reno I. COPA sought to provide the ex-
plicit definitions of the statute's crucial terms. 86 Such explicitly defined
terms had the intended effect of limiting the scope of affected materials
to the World Wide Web and not the more general internet;187 limiting the
scope of application to solely "commercial purposes;"' 88 and limiting the
scope to only material deemed "harmful to minors.' ' 89 The phrase
"harmful to minors" was defined in the text of COPA and consequently
raised some constitutional issues in the judicial considerations that fol-
lowed the statute's enactment. Congress defined "harmful to minors"
with a three-part analysis, which must be found before liability may at-
tach under COPA.' 9° The statute further defines a "minor" as a person
under the age of seventeen. 91 Finally, COPA provided some affirmative
defenses for commercial entities accused of violating the statute. 92 De-
184. See Reno I1, 521 U.S. at 885.
185. COPA, 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)(1998): "Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the
character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web,
makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes
any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more
than 6 months, or both."
186. See Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 167 (discussing the text of COPA).
187. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at n.4 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(1)). "COPA defines the clause 'by
means of the World Wide Web' as the 'placement of material in a computer server-based file archive
so that it is publicly accessible, over the Internet, using hypertext transfer protocol or any successor
protocol."'
188. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at n.5 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 232 1(e)(2)(A)). "COPA defines the clause
'commercial purposes' as those individuals or entities that are 'engaged in the business of making
such communications."'
189. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at n.5 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B)). "COPA defines a person
'engaged in the business' as one who makes a communication, or offers to make a communication,
by means of the World Wide Web, that includes any material that is harmful to minors, devotes time,
attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course of such person's trade or business, with the
objective of earning a profit as a result of such activities (although it is not necessary that the person
make a profit or that the making or offering to make such communications be the person's sole or
principle business or source of income)."
190. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 168. The three-part test stated:
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking
the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a
manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or
sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition
of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and (C) taken as a whole, lacks serious,
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
191. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7).
192. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 168 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)). The affirmative defenses
provided that if a commercial entity "restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to
minors" through the use of a "credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
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spite the attempts by Congress to conform COPA to meet the problems
raised in Reno H, a suit was filed seeking a preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of this second congressional attempt to regulate
information disseminated over the internet.
On October 22, 1998 the plaintiffs' 93 filed an action in the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking a prelimi-
nary injunction against the enforcement of COPA. 94 The plaintiffs
claimed that COPA was invalid on its face and as applied to them under
the First Amendment by burdening speech which is protected for adults;
that it violated the First Amendment rights of minors; and that it is un-
constitutionally vague under the First and Fifth Amendments. 95 The
District Court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits
of their Constitutional claims and granted their request for a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of COPA. 9 6 The government ap-
pealed this ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.197
The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's granting of the pre-
liminary injunction. 98 In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals
relied heavily upon the findings of fact made by the lower court and it
reviewed the District Court's conclusions of law under a de novo stan-
dard. 199 The four elements necessary for a preliminary injunction to be
warranted include: (1) the reasonable probability of success; (2) whether
the movant will be irreparably harmed by denial of the relief; (3) whether
granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the non-
moving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in
the public interest.2° Clearly, the first of these three elements attracted
most of the court's attention in its decision.
First, the court noted that the District Court was correct in finding
that since COPA was a content based restriction on speech, it was "pre-
sumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny analysis. ' 2° 1 As a result
of the necessary strict scrutiny analysis the government was required to
identification number.. .a digital certificate that verifies age.. or by any other reasonable measures
that are feasible under available technology" then no liability will attach.
193. The list of plaintiffs is too lengthy for full presentation here; the plaintiffs were essentially
those that filed suit in Reno 11, which include the American Civil Liberties Union; Androgyny Books
d/b/a A Different Light Bookstores; American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression; and
Artnet Worldwide Corp.
194. ACLU v. Reno (Reno 111), 31 F. Supp.2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999). COPA was to
become effective on November 29, 1998. Id.
195. Reno III, 31 F. Supp.2d at 477.
196. Id.
197. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 165.
198. Id. at 181.
199. Id. at 172.
200. Id. (quoting Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999).
201. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 173 (quoting Reno 1II, 31 F. Supp.2d at 493).
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"establish that the challenged statute is narrowly tailored to meet a com-
pelling state interest, and that it seeks to protect its interest in a manner
that is the least restrictive of protected speech. 2 °2 Further, the court
noted that the Supreme Court has recognized each medium of expression
may present unique justifications for government regulation.20 3 Yet the
Third Circuit differentiated the Internet from other forms of media that
were historically subject to government regulations.2 4 Unlike other
regulated mediums, the Internet did not have a history of regulation nor
did it have a limited number of frequencies.20 5 Thus, the standard of re-
view for content-based regulation of speech via the Internet presented the
Court with a unique and continually developing area of Constitutional
Law.
The intrinsic characteristics of the Internet presented the revised
"contemporary community standards" test provided in COPA with some
unique challenges. Congress attempted to revise the test from the CDA
(overturned in Reno II) in COPA by adding that "the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find the work taken
as a whole, [to appeal] to the prurient interest."206 It was this revised test
that the court found to be in conflict with the inherent nature of the Inter-
net. The court noted that the Internet is not geographically limited;201 that
information is instantaneously available on the Internet as soon as it is
published;20 8 and that current technology prevents Web publishers from
circumventing particular jurisdictions or limiting their site's content
"from entering any [specific] geographic community.' '2°9 As a result of
these unique characteristics of the Internet, the court concluded that
COPA's adoption of the Miller "contemporary community standards"
test would have an overbroad effect. 210 The court determined this over-
broad effect would restrict the constitutionally protected speech of adults
to the most stringent standards of the least liberal communities, therein
211
depriving adults of free access to protected forms of speech. Such a
stringent limitation to the lowest common denominator has consistently
202. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 173 (citing Schaumbern v. Citizens for a Bctter Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
637 (1980)). The Court noted that this approach was recently confirmed in United States v. Playboy
Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 2000 WL 646196 (U.S. 2000) (discussing the "bleeding" of cable
transmissions and holding § 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 unconstitutional as
violative of the First Amendment).
203. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at n.18.
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting Reno I1, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)).
206. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 174.
207. Id. at 175 (quoting Reno 111, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 482-92).
208. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 175 (citing American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 166; Reno 111, 31 F.
Supp. 2d at 483).
209. Id. (quoting Reno II, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484).




been held to be in violation of the First Amendment in all the preceding
Reno decisions.
Finally, the court considered whether COPA was "readily suscepti-
ble" to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional.212
Courts generally recognized two methods of narrowing an otherwise
unconstitutionally broad statute: (1) by "assigning a narrow meaning to
the language of the statute or; (2) deleting that portion of the statute that
is unconstitutional, while preserving the remainder of the statute
intact. 213 The court attempted both approaches at the behest of the gov-
ernment. First, the court concluded that in previous applications of the
Miller "contemporary community standards" test, it was applied on a
geographic basis, and therefore could not be read narrowly to present an
"adult" rather than a geographic standard in this instance. Second, the
court concluded that by striking the contemporary community standards
test from COPA would have the effect of rendering the rest of the statute
215virtually meaningless. The test was held to be an "integral part of the
statute, permeating and influencing the whole of the statute" and thus, its
216removal would not salvage the constitutional remnants. 6 Therefore, the
court concluded that COPA was not susceptible to a narrow reading and
accordingly it was deemed likely that the plaintiffs would succeed on
their constitutional challenge to COPA.217
The Third Circuit briefly addressed the remaining two prongs of the
preliminary injunction test. First, the court noted that "in a First Amend-
ment challenge, a plaintiff who meets the first prong of the test ... will
almost certainly meet the second, since irreparable injury normally arises
out of the deprivation of speech rights."' 8 Therefore, the court concluded
that the second prong was likely met in this situation. 2 19 Finally, in ap-
plying the balancing test required by the third prong, the court concluded
that the threats of COPA on constraining constitutionally protected
speech far outweighed the damage that would be caused by the denial of
220the requested injunction. While the court concluded that the District
Court properly granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction
212. Id. (quoting Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)).
213. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 177 (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502
(1985)).
214. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 178. The Court noted that prior decisions have recognized that the
nation is simply too large and too diverse for a common standard of "obscene" or "indecent"
materials to be adequately defined at a national level. In fact, it was this rationale that lead the Court
to develop the "contemporary community standard" in the Miller decision (which was based on
geographic notions of "community"). Id. (discussing Miller, 413 U.S. at 30, 33).
215. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 179.
216. id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 180 (quoting Reno 1 929 F. Supp. 824, 826).
219. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 180.
220. Id
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prohibiting the enforcement of COPA, this conclusion was not the end of
the court's decision.
The final paragraph of the Reno IV decision provides some intrigu-
ing dicta concerning the future of this area of the law. The Court stated:
"we . . . express our confidence and firm conviction that developing
technology will soon render the 'community standards' challenge moot,
thereby making congressional regulation to protect minors from harmful
materials on the Web constitutionally practicable. 2 21 This statement,
which has been reiterated by several of the Reno courts in a variety of
ways, points to technology as the key solution to Congress' ability to
regulate information sent to minors over the Internet. These technologi-
cal advancements must be able to adequately protect children from mate-
rial obscene to them, while not placing an undue burden on adult speech
not encompassed by the obscenity standards for children in the relevant
community. Beyond this, it is unclear what these advancements will en-
tail or to what extent they will be required. In the final analysis, the four
Reno decisions coupled with the Johnson decision blaze an ambiguous
trail for both legislators and parents wishing to protect their children
from the perceived dangers of the World Wide Web.
IV. ANALYSIS
The ramifications of the Johnson decision will be felt both inside of
and outside of the Tenth Circuit. Internet business growth rates suggest
that dissemination of information via the Internet is the way the world
will operate in the 21s" Century. As a result, regulation of how informa-
tion is transmitted over the Internet is a crucial topic facing the legal pro-
fession today. Encompassed in any discussion of regulation of the Inter-
net are two broad constitutional issues: First Amendment Rights of indi-
viduals and Commerce Clause limits on state powers. The Tenth Circuit
decision in Johnson was one of first impression for the Circuit, but the
decision also followed the Supreme Court's guidance in Reno v. ACLU.
Additionally, other federal courts appear to be in general agreement with
both Reno and Johnson.22 2 The effect of the Tenth Circuit ruling in John-son is twofold.
First, courts have clearly taken notice of the unusual nature of the
Internet and have consistently pointed to several unique characteristics of
the Internet that effectuate key differences from other mediums of ex-
pression. For example, in Reno IV, the Third Circuit reviewed the differ-
ences between broadcast media, such as television or radio, and the
221. Id. at 181.
222. See generally Cyberspace Comm. Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999);




Internet.223 As a result of its non-geographic structure, the Internet is a
unique target of government regulation.224 The question of the Internet's
international character has yet to be adequately addressed by the Ameri-
can courts. However, due to its inherently national character, courts ap-
pear to agree that there must be uniform regulation of the Internet, at the
national, as opposed to the state level. The balance between regulating
the Internet and the continued protection of constitutional rights is an
omnipresent challenge to the Congress and the courts. The Johnson deci-
sion and other similar decisions addressed only the surface of potential
conflicts between the regulation of the Internet and the protection of con-
stitutional guarantees. Nevertheless, these preliminary decisions laid an
important foundation upon which future courts will build a body of
Internet regulation.
Second, the Johnson decision affects the balance of power between
the states and the federal government. The age-old debate of states'
rights versus national rights is inherent in the American system of Feder-
alism. Nonetheless, the potential power that the Internet may soon wield
in the stream of commerce and communication is a source of potential
conflict between the states and the federal government. State legislatures
will certainly want to gain a voice in the development of the Internet to
bring the prosperity of the Internet within the state. However, as the
courts have suggested, there is a need to regulate the Internet on a na-
tional level.
Regulation at the state level would compromise the success of the
Internet. A lack of national uniformity in regulating the Internet would
likely result in an inability of the Internet to offer the benefits of simulta-
neous, instantaneous communications and commerce as it currently aims
to achieve. Regulation on a state-by-state basis would most likely create
a patchwork regulatory system. Such a patchwork system would impede
the ability of many Internet services to function in a profitable manner.
For example, if New Mexico and Colorado both passed regulations on
the dissemination of materials to minors via the Internet; but New Mex-
ico banned all indecent material, while Colorado imposed a less restric-
tive regulation, how would a company wishing to do business via the
Internet in both states act? The company would be forced either to make
its entire Internet materials conform to the New Mexico statute, or to
choose to avoid doing business in New Mexico altogether.
In contrast, if the Federal government enacted a single, uniform
regulation such patchwork regulation would not be of concern to the
business wishing to carry on business nationwide via the Internet. The
business would be able to access consumers nation-wide without the risk
of violating 50 different statutory schemes. Clearly such uniform regula-
223. Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 168-69.
224. Id. at 169.
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tion would provide the greatest benefit to the continued growth of the
Internet as a means of commercial activity in the United States.
The central issue remains to what extent does the holding in John-
son and other similar decisions have on the future of Internet regula-
tions? The final answer remains to be determined. The only certainty in
this field is that attempts to regulate the Internet will continue and the
tension between government action and parental choice will likely de-
volve into a moot discussion when technology catches Constitutional
theory. Parental control still remains the best and most likely source of
protecting minors from indecent materials, however defined. Until such
time as technology offers controls that conform to the constraints of the
Constitution, parents must take the lead in assuring that the Internet is a
safe place for children to roam.
CONCLUSION
The Internet is clearly a revolutionary new medium of expression.
The opportunity for persons to exchange ideas worldwide with the in-
stant click of a mouse is truly unique. The Internet provides for greater
communication among people on an infinite range of subjects. This free-
dom of expression has never before been provided with such a powerful
tool. Yet with this advantage comes concern, specifically related to mi-
nors accessing materials that are not appropriate for children. This con-
cern has prompted government intervention and regulation. It is this
regulation that strikes at the very core of what it means to be "Ameri-
can." The Constitution seeks to protect expression, not simply because it
is a noble concept, but more precisely because it is the freedom of ex-
pression that drives democracy. Free expression among citizens is the
most essential ingredient of a functional and successful democratic soci-
ety. Thus, it is the opinion of this author that the courts have so far been
correct in holding the governmental regulations invalid as violating the
most basic principles of the Constitution. Further, it is clear that with the
continued growth of technology, parents will be better equipped to pre-
vent their children from accessing material that the parent deems harm-
ful. Removing the power of a parent and placing it in the hands of gov-
ernment is at a minimum troublesome, and the worst, Orwellian. Clearly,
the duty to regulate the dissemination of information to minors over the
Internet must be left in the sovereign hand of parents, and the parents
alone.
Tim Shea
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